A nut to crack: Oreshnik won’t turn the tide in Ukraine, but it gives NATO a reason to rethink its missile defenses

On the night of November 20-21, Russia launched a missile strike on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. While Russia has carried hundreds of missile attacks against Ukraine throughout the war — employing short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range one-way attack drones — this attack stood out, as it featured a new medium- to intermediate-range ballistic missile called “Oreshnik.”

Oreshnik is significant for several reasons, including its technical characteristics, how it compares to other ballistic missile systems used in the war so far, and the potential threat it poses to NATO’s defensive posture in Europe. Moreover, it offers insights into the past and future of arms control with Russia.

What do we know about Oreshnik?

Oreshnik is a new missile system derived from the Russian RS-26 Rubezh (SS-X-31), which was developed between 2008 and 2018 but was mothballed before achieving full operational capability.

U.S. intelligence confirmed the Oreshnik’s origin as being based on the RS-26 shortly after its initial use. However, even before official confirmation, this was a logical conclusion to make. Russia’s defense industry lacks the capacity for significant innovation, and its missile sector is already operating at maximum capacity. The industry simply does not have the resources to design, develop, test, and produce an entirely new missile. Unless Russia somehow uncovered additional capacity and ingenuity — a highly unlikely scenario — the Oreshnik must necessarily be based on an existing missile system.

According to Ukrainian assessments, development of the RS-26 continued under the new designation “Kedr,” reportedly describing the same capability as the Oreshnik. Like the RS-26, the Oreshnik is almost certainly a solid-propellant, two-stage missile, with stages identical to the first two used in the RS-24 YaRS intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

While Putin described Oreshnik as having medium-range ballistic missile capability (1,000-3,000 km), it likely falls within the intermediate-range spectrum (3,000–5,500 km) and could potentially engage targets at the lower bounds of the intercontinental-range spectrum (>5,500 km), depending on the trajectory flown and the payload carried.

Perhaps the most notable feature demonstrated by the Oreshnik was its non-nuclear MIRV capability, enabling it to carry multiple warheads that can be independently targeted. Although MIRV technology is common in nuclear ICBMs, the Oreshnik is the first and currently the only operational ballistic missile confirmed to feature a non-nuclear MIRV payload. (There have been unconfirmed claims that some Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Khorramshahr, may also be equipped with MIRV technology.)

That said, the exact payload configuration of the Oreshnik remains somewhat unclear. Reports and imagery from the attack suggest that the Oreshnik carries six re-entry vehicles, each equipped with a non-nuclear warhead. This is more than the RS-26, which could carry only four re-entry vehicles. It is unclear whether this increase was achieved by enhancing the missile’s overall payload capacity or by reducing the size and weight of individual re-entry vehicles.

According to reports from the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (HUR), each of these warheads contains six submunitions, though the exact nature of these submunitions remains unknown. What can be said with high certainty is that conventional explosives are very likely not part of the warhead system. Given the high-speed descent of the re-entry vehicles, which just prior to impact reach terminal velocities of three to four kilometers per second, timing the ignition of conventional explosives with sufficient precision would require highly advanced altimeter and fuse technology, which Russia does not have access to. Detonating the explosives upon impact would also be ineffective, as the submunitions’ high terminal velocity would cause the explosives to disintegrate upon ground contact before they had a chance to ignite.

As such, it is highly likely that the submunitions used in the warhead system represent inert payloads, meaning they do not feature a nuclear or conventional payload and are, essentially, just a weight. While this is a rudimentary solution, it suggests that Russia has successfully developed a dedicated warhead and payload for the Oreshnik, distinct from other missiles in its arsenal.

Still, the lethality of the Oreshnik against most types of targets is low, primarily due to its lack of accuracy. The RS-26, on which the Oreshnik is largely based, was developed primarily as a nuclear-armed missile system. For nuclear-capable missiles, high accuracy is often unnecessary because the immense yields of nuclear warheads can compensate for terminal inaccuracies and near misses (unless they are intended for narrow counterforce purposes, which was likely not the case for the RS-26). However, when a nuclear missile system is reconfigured to carry non-nuclear warheads without implementing a substantial improvement in accuracy, its lethality is greatly reduced. This appears to be the case with the Oreshnik, whose projectiles failed to cause critical damage to any of the targets engaged in Dnipro.

Russia was likely aware before the launch that the strike would cause minimal damage and carried it out primarily for signaling purposes, in response to Ukraine being authorized to strike targets inside Russia using Western missile systems. The viral images that spread following the attack showed a MIRVed payload descending on its target — a technology previously associated exclusively with nuclear capabilities. This was intended as a stark reminder that, while the initial attack on Dnipro employed a non-nuclear payload, future missile strikes could involve nuclear warheads.

Compared to other known non-nuclear missiles in Russia's arsenal, the Oreshnik has a significantly different flight profile. The high terminal velocity of the Oreshnik’s reentry vehicles, as reported and demonstrated, suggests that the missile followed a high and steep trajectory. This is consistent with its range limitations and the reported launcher position at the Kapustin Yar missile training and test site, approximately 800 km from Ukraine. The high-altitude trajectory might also explain why Ukraine initially assumed the missile system was an ICBM, which are known for reaching high exo-atmospheric apogees.

This trajectory is markedly different from other Russian ballistic missiles extensively used during the full-scale war, such as the ground-launched 9M723 short-range ballistic missile of the Iskander-M system and the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile. The 9M723 and Kinzhal remain within the atmosphere for most or all of their flight and slow down to sub-hypersonic speeds during their descent. However, both of these systems are likely far more maneuverable during their terminal approach than Oreshnik’s re-entry vehicles, which likely lack the necessary thrusters or aerodynamic surfaces for effective maneuvering.

Overall, Oreshnik’s direct impact on the war is likely to remain limited, particularly from a military perspective. If Russia aims to cause critical damage against key targets, it has other missile systems in its arsenal that are more accurate and that carry substantially larger payloads, making them far more reliable for these types of purposes. That said, the Oreshnik could still inflict significant damage if used against civilian targets, such as city centers or apartment complexes. In this context, the attack likely served a secondary signaling purpose aimed at Ukraine’s government and population, demonstrating that Russia retains the capability to deploy additional terror weapons and threaten Ukrainian population centers at will.

Implications for NATO missile defense

Although lacking in sophistication, the Oreshnik nevertheless represents a challenge to NATO’s missile defense architecture. The missile’s flight regime means that widely used NATO ballistic missile defense systems, most notably the MIM-104 Patriot but also the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, offer only limited defense against the missile system.

Unlike shorter-range ballistic missile systems, Oreshnik is a medium to intermediate-range ballistic missile that can approach its targets from altitudes well outside the atmosphere and close in with a comparatively high terminal velocity. Neither Patriot nor SAMP/T are optimized for this type of threat. “Optimized” is a keyword here. These systems may still be able to provide some level of protection, just not a reliably effective level.

Effectively defending against ballistic missiles like Oreshnik therefore requires other types of missile defense systems — those that intercept missile threats higher in the atmosphere, or even outside of it (see the graphic below).

Examples include the American SM-3, which can be launched from NATO surface vessels or land-based Aegis Ashore sites, as well as interceptors used in the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which is currently not deployed to Europe. Another missile defense capability that could likely counter the Oreshnik is Germany’s Arrow 3 ballistic missile defense system, which is expected to reach initial operational capability by late 2025.

As outlined above, given that the Oreshnik’s MIRV payload likely has limited maneuverability — at least when compared to aeroballistic missile threats like the 9M723 or Kinzhal — intercepting its warheads should be relatively straightforward, particularly in terms of aligning the kinetic interceptor warhead on a collision course with the projectile. The greater challenge is likely the sheer number of warheads a single Oreshnik can deliver, even if they are relatively rudimentary and unsophisticated. This could lead to NATO states depleting their missile defense interceptors quite rapidly.

For example, there are two Aegis Ashore sites in Europe equipped with SM-3 interceptors. One is located in Deveselu, Romania, and has been operational since 2012. The other is in Redzikowo, Poland, and became operational earlier this year. Each Aegis Ashore site is equipped with Mk41 launcher tubes containing eight cells each, for a total of 24 SM-3 interceptors per site. Before the war in Ukraine, U.S. and NATO doctrine foresaw the allocation of three interceptors per incoming ballistic missile in order to achieve a probability of interception exceeding 90 percent.

Even if NATO were to use only two SM-3 interceptors per Oreshnik reentry vehicle — which might be justified considering the lack of the reentry vehicles’ maneuverability and sophistication, as well as the demonstrated effectiveness of U.S. ballistic missile defense capabilities throughout the war — each Aegis Ashore site could intercept a maximum of just 12 projectiles before requiring a reload. Oreshnik can carry up to six reentry vehicles, and SM-3 interceptors do not have the range to intercept the post-boost vehicle carrying the reentry vehicles prior to separation. As a result, as few as four Oreshnik missiles could theoretically overwhelm NATO’s Aegis Ashore missile defense capability and deplete its land-based SM-3 interceptor arsenal.

This being said, it’s important not to overreact to this new threat. Moscow likely has a very limited capacity to field Oreshnik ballistic missiles, as its missile production capabilities are already operating at maximum capacity. Any Oreshnik missiles currently in Russia’s arsenal are almost certainly not newly produced but rather reinstated and modified RS-26 missiles.

This suggests that until Russia can establish a production line for Oreshnik missiles, the potential depth of its arsenal will depend on the number of RS-26 early production units held in storage. While it is challenging to estimate these numbers, it is probably reasonable to assume that there are no more than 20-30 missiles — and potentially less than that.

As such, the primary ballistic missile threat from Russia will continue to come from endo-atmospheric short- and medium-range aeroballistic missiles like the 9M723 and Kinzhal, which have dedicated production lines and are manufactured in substantial numbers. Frantic revisions to NATO’s missile defense plans and procurement projects are therefore neither necessary nor warranted.

Furthermore, there might even be an argument for disregarding the Oreshnik threat altogether. The missile’s inaccuracy, combined with the low lethality of its inert kinetic energy projectiles, means Russia would need considerable luck to achieve critical hits on key targets. The best course of action, therefore, might be to ignore incoming Oreshnik threats and conserve limited interceptor stockpiles for higher-value targets, most notably Russian nuclear-capable missiles armed with non-strategic nuclear warheads that might be launched in the early phases of a NATO-Russia war that has crossed the nuclear threshold.

Unfortunately, there are two problems with this approach

First, is it actually a good idea to rely on the adversary not getting lucky and failing to score a critical hit? Military prudence would suggest otherwise. Second, Oreshnik is dual-capable, meaning that, theoretically, any missile launched could carry a nuclear payload and must be treated as a high-value target. In practice, context clues — such as the stage and intensity of an escalating conflict — can provide insights into whether the missile is likely armed with a nuclear or conventional payload, though certainty is difficult to achieve. Military prudence would therefore again dictate engaging most if not all Oreshnik missiles.

As a result, even though Oreshnik is not the most lethal weapon in Russia’s ballistic missile arsenal — far from it — it could play a disruptive role in NATO’s missile defense planning by depleting NATO’s higher-echelon missile defense assets relatively early in a conflict. While overreacting to the missile therefore does not seem appropriate, Oreshnik poses a distinct challenge that cannot be fully ignored.

Finally, Oreshnik further demonstrates that effective missile defense cannot rely solely on defensive measures. It must be complemented by an offensive counterstrike capability that can credibly threaten to neutralize the missile threat before launch, whether by targeting the launcher and missile system, production facilities, or associated command-and-control sites. Such an approach is far more efficient than depending on expensive interceptor systems, which, even if successful, are likely to be cost-ineffective in neutralizing their targets.

From 2026 onward, the United States will deploy several medium-range missile capabilities in Europe as part of the Multi-Domain Task Force stationed in Germany. These include the U.S. Army Mid-Range Capability (MRC), a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk cruise missile with a range of 1,600 km; the Precision-Strike Missile (PrSM), a ground-launched aeroballistic missile with a range of 500 km; and the Dark Eagle hypersonic missile system, which is supposed to have a range of up to 3,000 km. While these systems are theoretically capable of engaging Oreshnik launchers, none are optimized to address the threat posed by a Russian medium- to intermediate-range missile.

The MRC, due to its low speed, is ineffective against time-sensitive targets like mobile launchers. While the PrSM is theoretically better suited for this role, its baseline version lacks the necessary range. Dark Eagle, although fast enough and with sufficient range, is prohibitively expensive — at $40 million per shot, it is produced in limited quantities and is likely reserved for higher-value targets than individual launchers. This being said, systems like MRC and Dark Eagle could prove useful for engaging stationary missile-related assets, such as production facilities located within range — and enemy headquarters.

Ideally, NATO would require its own medium- to intermediate-range conventional missile capability to provide a credible counterstrike option capable of neutralizing the Oreshnik — along with a broader missile-related target set. Recently, reports surfaced that France might consider developing a conventional ballistic missile with a range of 1,000 km. However, no concrete steps toward development have yet been taken. As such, Oreshnik at present represents a blind spot that continues to plague NATO’s deterrence posture.

Oreshnik and the INF

Beyond its immediate force posture implications for NATO, the development and use of the Oreshnik MRBM/IRMB yields further consequences. Most notably, the Oreshnik serves as further evidence that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was effectively dead long before the United States withdrew under Trump in 2019.

The INF Treaty, signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, eliminated all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, along with their launchers. It included a comprehensive verification regime, granting U.S., Soviet, and later Russian officials extensive on-site access to verify the absence of treaty-prohibited missile systems. Until its ultimate demise, the INF Treaty was widely regarded as one of the world’s most successful arms control agreements, as it not only regulated but entirely eliminated an entire class of weapon systems.

Why is the Oreshnik relevant to the dead treaty? As outlined above, the Oreshnik is derived from the RS-26. As such, given that the Oreshnik and the RS-26 are, to a large extent, the same missile, they share many features, including payload capacity, range, and function. If the Oreshnik is classified as a medium- to intermediate-range missile, it is highly probable that the RS-26 also primarily falls within this range category — rather than being a strategic intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), as was claimed by Russia when the RS-26 was first tested. In other words, the RS-26 very likely fell within the range restrictions imposed by the INF Treaty and, therefore, should never have been developed by Russia.

To be fair to Russia, the INF Treaty did not prohibit the development of INF range missiles, even if doing so clearly violated the treaty’s spirit.

According to the INF Treaty, the “range capability” of a ground-launched ballistic missile is defined as “the maximum range to which it has been tested” (Article 7(4)). Russia tested the RS-26 as an ICBM at a range of 5,800 kilometers in May 2012, which allowed Moscow to technically avoid making a material breach of the agreement. However, even at the time, U.S. officials voiced dissatisfaction with the RS-26, accusing Russia of testing it at an ICBM range — potentially by reducing the payload weight during the test launch — as a way to circumvent the treaty’s limitations.

The events of recent weeks have validated these concerns. Had the RS-26 entered service instead of being mothballed prior to reaching full operational capability, it would very likely have provided Russia with a ground-launched medium- to intermediate-range missile system, in clear contradiction of its obligations under the INF Treaty.

The future of NATO-Russia arms control

It’s worth reiterating that the INF Treaty was suboptimally phrased in respect to the range capability of ground-launched ballistic missiles, which created a loophole that Russia exploited to bypass the treaty without committing a material breach. And here it must also be noted that Russia did egregiously violate the treaty with other missile systems, most notably the 9M729 Novator ground-launched cruise missile.

Nevertheless, the broader issue is that arms control treaties like the INF often struggle to effectively translate complex technical realities into political agreements. Even though the INF was arguably superior to many other treaties in this regard, given its extensive verification regime, it still provided for loopholes that allowed participating states to circumvent treaty restrictions. For arms control treaties to function properly, both sides must therefore trust that the other will not exploit potential loopholes or undermine the treaty’s spirit, even in the absence of a clear material breach.

In this context, the Oreshnik, with its apparent ties to the RS-26, serves as further evidence that, from at least the mid-2000s, Russia ceased to view the INF Treaty as a genuine arms control measure. Instead, it treated the treaty as a means to create asymmetric advantages over NATO by developing restricted missile capabilities while ensuring NATO remained constrained.

Given this history, why should NATO consider returning to arms control agreements with Russia, even if the opportunity arises? It is, of course, impossible to confidently predict how NATO-Russia relations will evolve in the coming years and decades, and whether hostility will continue to define inter-state relations during this time. Consider that Germany emerged from World War Two in 1945 as a pariah state, only for West Germany to be reintegrated as a member of the Western alliance by 1955 following extensive democratic state-building efforts and reforms.

In any case, restoring and rebuilding the trust necessary to enter into comprehensive arms control agreements will likely take decades, much as it did during the Cold War. Additionally, it will require a fundamental shift in how Russia’s leadership approaches international agreements, moving away from a stance characterized by opportunism and exploitation toward one focused on accepting the idea that win-win solutions really do exist.