Farther right: France is emerging as Europe's new immigration hardliner

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Rightward Shift

Ongoing debates over the 2025 budget could play a key role in shaping the overall policy of France's new government. Jordan Bardella, leader of the far-right National Rally and an ally of Marine Le Pen, described the government's actions as a “backdoor return of Macronism.” However, other observers speak of a genuine “rightward shift,” one which may no longer even align with Emmanuel Macron’s own views.

In Prime Minister Michel Barnier’s cabinet, 18 out of 39 positions are held by Macron supporters, although not all of them are formally part of the president's Renaissance party. Macronists hold key portfolios such as education, finance, foreign affairs, and defense. Among them is Agnès Pannier-Runacher, Minister for Ecological Transition, who is known for reportedly refusing to shake hands with members of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally. Ten other ministers come from the right-wing Republicans party. Bruno Retailleau, the interior minister, is formally aligned with Macron, but his appointment has raised the most questions.

The composition of the government reflects Macron's political maneuvering. After this summer's snap elections, the new parliament was nearly evenly divided into three blocs. Not even the left-wing coalition, the New People's Front, which secured the most votes, managed to put together the 289-seat majority needed to form a government. The left was unwilling to collaborate with Macron, while no one wanted to form a coalition with the far right. Macronists, on their own, also could not form a government without partners. As a result, the president turned to the center-right, where he found Michel Barnier. Barnier put together a cabinet that is strongly opposed by the left, but Marine Le Pen and other far-right figures agreed to offer temporary support, even though they were not included in the coalition.

The left has branded Macron’s post-election moves as a “power grab.” They tried to pass a no-confidence vote against the government, but it failed. According to Olivier Faure, leader of the Socialist Party, the new cabinet is “flipping off democracy.”

The far right doesn’t have much praise to offer the government either. Bardella has declared that the government “has no future,” and the conservative magazine Causeur wrote that it was one of Macron’s favorite “hyper-solutions” — an attempt to address a large number of problems with one elegant move. Causeur considers this practice to be dangerous for the country’s stability, describing it as a form of “magical thinking.” Nevertheless, for now at least, the right continues to consistently vote in support of the government, right alongside Macron’s allies. This may be because they expect the government to implement traditional “right-wing” policies, particularly in the area of migration.

The Ultra-Right Policymaker

The most influential conservative in this government is Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau, who is seen by the left as controversial and by many on the right as the very embodiment of an ideal figure — both in politics and in personal life. Retailleau holds a hardline stance on immigration and conservative social views, combined with liberal economic policies. He is a practicing Catholic, a family man, and the father of three children.

Retailleau also voted against same-sex marriage and the inclusion of abortion rights in the French Constitution. He advocates prison sentences for first-time offenders, is in favor of lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 16, and supports suspending social and family assistance for parents who fail in their child-rearing responsibilities. While these measures are formally aimed at everyone, they would disproportionately affect the poorest segments of the population, particularly immigrants. Retailleau summed up his program as interior minister in just a few words: “I have three priorities: restoring order, restoring order, restoring order.”

The minister views the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as a threat to France's sovereignty. Twenty years ago, he opposed the Lisbon Treaty, which granted the EU its own legal standing, and he continues to reject any movement toward European federalism.

However, the most radical element of his platform is immigration — or rather, its cessation. “The issue of immigration, which has transformed French society more than anything else, must be decided by the French people,” he stated last December, calling for a referendum to limit new arrivals. That said, Retailleau has yet to provide specific wording for the potential referendum questions.

Additionally, Retailleau openly supports the so-called “double punishment” policy, which involves deporting migrants after they have been convicted and served prison sentences in France. This idea has previously been ruled unconstitutional by France’s Constitutional Council, as have various amendments on migration regulation. Nevertheless, since taking office as interior minister, Retailleau has once again called for changes to the French Constitution, both to allow referendums on such issues and to make it possible to impose broader restrictions on migrants' rights.

Ignoring experts

The anti-immigration proposals of the interior minister have sparked a negative response from many French politicians and economists. In their view, these measures threaten the “republican model,” which serves as the ideological foundation of the French state. According to this model, any form of categorization or discrimination based on ethnicity or religion is strictly prohibited. Furthermore, such policies could have detrimental economic consequences.

“For every 10% increase in the share of skilled immigrants (in overall employment), there is a 4.1% increase in the number of patents per company,” noted Gianluca Orefice, a professor of economics at Paris Dauphine University PSL, citing the results of a study conducted in France. “France has seen a steady rise in immigrant numbers, but it is relatively modest compared to the growth seen in its European neighbors,” said researcher Mitia Oberti in response to proposals to all but ban immigration to France.

“Immigration poses neither a burden on public finances nor a threat to local workers in terms of employment and wages,” Oberti argues. “On the contrary, by meeting labor demands or promoting innovation, immigration appears to be a key driver of growth and productivity both in the short and long term.” According to her data, 61% of companies in France faced difficulties recruiting staff in 2023. Despite the fact that some immigrants receive state benefits, demographic factors make their impact on the national budget negligible, as they belong predominantly to the most economically active age groups — between 20 and 60 years old. This demographic, on average, contributes more in social and other payments than they receive in benefits, according to years of research. This is supported by OECD data, which shows that, on average, from 2006 to 2018, immigrants in France contributed +0.3% to GDP, meaning their contribution to the economy outweighed the government's expenditures on them.

However, Retailleau seems little concerned with the opinions of experts — he has other authorities. On October 2, the minister consulted with his political mentor and ally, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy, who served as interior minister from 2002-2004 and again from 2005-2007 before serving as president from 2007-2012, had repeatedly promised to reduce immigration and increase deportations — yet overall, the situation remained largely unchanged.

One of Sarkozy's key ideas was the concept of “selective immigration.” During his tenure, a significant portion of immigration to France came from former colonies and the Arab world, with family reunification being the most common reason for entry. Unemployment among first-generation immigrants consistently remained about twice as high as among native-born French citizens. Sarkozy aimed to attract more highly skilled professionals, similar to the situation in Britain at the time, where many workers from newly admitted EU countries were migrating.

Sarkozy even created a new ministry — Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Co-development of France — which faced criticism from the left, as well as from historians and scholars, who argued that it stigmatized immigrants and created the impression that a large number of French citizens with foreign-born parents were a threat to the nation. Three years later, the ministry was dissolved, and control over immigration was returned to the Interior Ministry. Sarkozy later admitted that creating the ministry had been a mistake.

In the end, Sarkozy’s attempts to change the structure of immigration — admitting fewer “family members” and more “specialists” — were unsuccessful. Retailleau is now trying to address the same issue: not only limiting illegal immigration but also reducing overall migration. His goal is to ensure that the courts do not overturn executive decisions, that political pressure from the left and center remains manageable, and that the economy does not suffer. Unlike Sarkozy, for example, he does not plan to ban foreign graduates from non-EU countries from staying in France after completing their studies.

Costlier healthcare

One of the key elements of the strategy to curb migration is to make the country less attractive to illegal migrants. The proposal includes limiting their access to social services and support wherever possible, tightening family reunification rules, rigorously verifying the age of applicants, and increasing the detention period before deportation from 90 to 210 days to give authorities enough time to carry out the expulsion. Currently, the 210-day detention period is applied only to those accused of terrorism.

In 2017, 13.5% of deportation orders were executed, but by 2021, the figure had dropped to just 5.6%. Retailleau has already promised to speed up the process, but the minister considers reducing the number of migrants arriving in the country to be an even more important priority.

One of Retailleau's already announced measures is to reform the healthcare system’s obligations to illegal migrants, as they allegedly come to France seeking accessible and free medical care. Created in 2000, the French State Medical Aid (AME) fund provides healthcare to low-income immigrants who have been in the country for at least three months — even if they are without a visa, residence permit, or health insurance. The aid covers 100% of medical expenses within the limits set by France's social security system.

Retailleau proposes replacing the AME with an emergency assistance fund for foreigners, which would cover only urgent medical care and only for undocumented people. The fund’s budget would be significantly reduced compared to the AME, despite the fact that the current amount is relatively small. In 2023, healthcare spending for migrants amounted to €1.1 billion, approximately 0.5% of France’s total healthcare budget.

Deportation to third countries

Anti-immigrant sentiments are rising across Europe. According to Eurobarometer, in winter 2021, 18% of respondents in the EU considered immigration to be their second most important issue (behind only the economy); by summer 2021, this number had increased to 25%, and in 2022, migration issues were mentioned by 31% of respondents. Charitable organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), note a trend: countries where refugees seek asylum are attempting to transfer the newcomers to third countries until decisions on their legal status are finalized.

Rwanda has gained particular popularity as an external “migrant reception center.” Denmark, known for having one of the strictest immigration policies in Europe, planned to send asylum seekers there. However, negotiations have been suspended since January 2023. Israel deported North African arrivals to Rwanda in 2018, but the Israeli Supreme Court soon put an end to this practice, as the deported individuals found themselves without rights, and many were subject to arrest or deportation back to their home countries.

The so-called “Rwanda Plan,” proposed by UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson in 2022, also stipulated that illegal migrants and asylum seekers would await the outcome of their cases in that country. The prospect of being stranded in Africa indefinitely was intended to deter those who were willing to risk everything for a better life. However, during the short time the program was in effect, approximately £700 million was spent, but only four people were actually sent out of the UK under its auspices.

A separate issue is that illegal migration is a large and very profitable business — one in which clients cannot complain about the quality of services. Therefore, after the British elections, which saw the conservatives suffer a defeat, the new government in London decided to change its approach. It canceled the “Rwanda Plan” and is creating a new agency to coordinate the actions of the immigration service, counterintelligence, border guards, and the National Crime Agency in combating gangs that organize illegal crossings of the English Channel.

Italy has begun deporting its asylum seekers to Albania, although this agreement was temporarily blocked by the Albanian Constitutional Court. In October, the French Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior traveled to study the Italian experience, explicitly stating that they liked the approach.

In early 2024, several European countries, including Finland, Italy, and Poland, appealed to the European Commission for a solution to transport migrants rescued at sea to a safe place outside the EU. The European Commission responded that such schemes do not align with EU laws and values.

However, the idea of redirecting refugees to a third country before they reach EU territory somehow seems to correspond to these values. Since the establishment of the partnership between Niger and the EU in 2016, around 3,000 Libyan refugees have been sent to the Nigerien capital, Niamey.

The European Union invested significantly in Niger as a transit country connecting West, Central, and North Africa. These efforts continued until the coup in 2023. Between 2016 and 2022, the EU — with Germany as the leader — spent a total of €1.148 billion on the initiative, half of it on projects directly related to security and migration control: border reinforcement, personnel training, and so on. The EU described the program as successful, noting that in May 2016, 70,000 people attempted to cross the Sahara, while in November 2019, only 1,500 did. However, the number of migrants did not decrease; rather, their route changed, becoming longer, more dangerous, and more expensive.

In addition, EU countries are increasing control at the internal borders of the Schengen Area. As of early October 2024, France, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Sweden, Norway, and Finland have either reinstated border controls or strengthened inspections. Their goals are stated clearly: “We want to reduce irregular migration further,” said German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser.

Some countries are even building walls. Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia have announced the specifications of the barriers to be constructed along their borders with Belarus. The Lithuanian barrier, for example, will be 3.4 meters high (and will be supplement with drones, radars, and motion sensors), while the Polish one will be 5.5 meters. Meanwhile, until the wall is built, Poland plans to temporarily halt the provision of asylum.

Options available to France

Given the experiences of other countries — and of France's own history — the new Interior Minister faces a challenging situation. Border control has already been implemented, but even before the Schengen Agreement was established, people crossed the border between Italy and France without guides or special training. The route from North Africa across the Mediterranean Sea to Italy and beyond is one of the most popular.

However, introducing amendments that radically limit the rights of immigrants would fundamentally alter France as a social and democratic state. Moreover, if migrants are deprived of social guarantees, they will seek support elsewhere — through charitable organizations, from their compatriots, or even from criminal groups. The conditions they escape in their home countries can often be more terrifying and hopeless than any sense of powerlessness they might encounter in Europe, making deterrence difficult to establish.

Agreements can be reached with the countries from which migrants arrive. For instance, on September 16, Germany signed a bilateral agreement with Uzbekistan, allowing for easier access to Germany for qualified Uzbek specialists in exchange for simplifying the deportation process for Uzbek citizens lacking German documentation. However, this could lead to legal complexities, as many such countries have poor reputations regarding human rights (which is why the European Convention on Human Rights poses significant challenges for the far-right).

Rightward shift without Le Pen

Retailleau's position is complicated by the need to demonstrate resolve to the right-wing electorate while also keeping in mind that the government relies on the support of far-right allies of Marine Le Pen. She is currently “giving the government a chance,” which is why on October 8, her party, the National Rally, did not vote in favor of a no-confidence motion put forth by the left.

However, the situation is unstable: on September 30, a trial began against Le Pen and 27 officials from her party for long-term embezzlement of European Parliament funds. Punishments may include a five-year ban on political activity, fines of up to €1 million, and prison sentences of up to ten years. If found guilty, the government led by Barnier, along with Retailleau's migration reforms, would lose the support of the National Rally, potentially jeopardizing the government’s capacity to withstand another no-confidence vote.

Thus Retailleau, while firmly established in his leadership role, is actively exploring new directions for France's migration policy. He appears particularly interested in the hardline approach adopted by the Italian government led by the Brothers of Italy party — a movement some critics characterize as neo-fascist. This rightward shift in French policy suggests that substantial immigration reform can occur even without the direct involvement of Marine Le Pen and her political allies in the government.