The ATACMS factor: Assessing the missiles’ impact one month after Kyiv got the green light to strike targets inside Russia

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What strikes hit Russian territory?

In mid-November 2024, The New York Times and The Washington Post reported that the outgoing administration of U.S. President Joe Biden had authorized the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to use ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG long-range missiles to strike targets on internationally recognized Russian territory. Previously, these missiles had been used exclusively against targets in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.

Since the permission was granted, the following instances of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG use on Russian soil have been reported:

• Nov. 19 — ATACMS targeted the 67th GRAU arsenal near the city of Karachev in the Bryansk Region. No significant damage was reported.
• Nov. 20 — A Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG strike hit the command post of the “North” troop grouping in the village of Maryino in Russia’s Kursk Region. The death of 18 Russian servicemen and the injury of a senior North Korean military official were reported.
• Nov. 23 — ATACMS targeted an S-400 air defense system position in the Kursk Region. Reports indicated the destruction of two launchers, a radar station, and the deaths of five Russian servicemen and three civilian specialists from the Almaz-Antey defense corporation (as the S-400 system was under repair).
• Nov. 25 — ATACMS struck the Kursk (Vostochny) (lit. “Kursk-Eastern”) airfield in the Kursk Region. No significant damage was reported.

In all cases, the Russian Ministry of Defense not only acknowledged the strikes but also described the damage they inflicted and reported on any losses sustained — a level of transparency that is highly unusual. The Russian MoD even published photos of individual missile fragments at the impact sites (1, 2, 3, 4).

In the midst of this November wave of strikes, Vladimir Putin signed a decree amending Russia’s nuclear doctrine in order to lower the threshold for use and launched an “Oreshnik” ballistic missile against a major military production site in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. In an address issued on Nov. 21, the Russian leader emphasized that the deployment of “Oreshnik” was taken “in response to [Ukraine’s] use of American and British long-range weaponry.”

From Nov. 25 forward, the AFU temporarily refrained from further strikes on Russian territory. On the night of Dec. 11, 2024, however, at least six ATACMS missiles (according to the Russian Ministry of Defense) were launched at Taganrog — a port city in Russia’s Rostov Region. The strike left 41 servicemen at a military airfield injured and one dead.

Which targets are within striking range?

The use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles has forced Russia’s military command to adjust to the threat of strikes deep in its rear. President Putin recently compared ATACMS to Russia’s Iskander operational-tactical missile and likened Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG to the air-launched Kh-101 missile. ATACMS variants are reported to have respective ranges of 165 km and 300 km, while the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles supplied to Ukraine are believed to reach up to 300 km. Notably, these high-cost missile launches are carried out at significant distances from the front line or border, typically no less than 25–50 km, regardless of whether they are ground- or air-launched.

Media often cite an assessment from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) stating that there are “hundreds of objects” for Western long-range weapons on Russian territory. But in reality, the number of genuinely important targets — purely military objects, excluding critical infrastructure and large industrial enterprises — is far smaller.

When evaluating the importance of specific targets, it is essential to weigh their potential impact on the front line against the limited availability of strike systems. Key priorities include large ammunition depots and military airfields, as the deployment of FAB glide bombs equipped with UMPK guidance systems remains a central component of the Russian Armed Forces' firepower strategy.

The Insider has identified and mapped over 30 major ammunition depots and airfields within the range of Ukrainian long-range munitions.

At the very edge of their range, Western missiles can also reach Novorossiysk, the new locations of several ships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. However, air defense system deployment sites (which are viable targets) were intentionally excluded from the map due to their mobility, as were logistical hubs, since ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG are not well-suited for disrupting their operations. Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG are specifically designed to target command posts, including hardened ones, as demonstrated on Nov. 20, 2024 via the Ukrainian strike on a Russian headquarters in Maryino, Kursk Region.

Another important nuance to remember when calculating the potential for Western weaponry to affect the battlefield situation in Ukraine is the fact that to guarantee a target’s destruction, multiple missiles must be launched simultaneously in order to get past Russian air defenses. In this case, ATACMS missiles can be used to disable air defense systems, enabling the AFU to strike Russian territory with domestically-developed systems, including missiles and loitering munitions.

How will the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow affect the course of the war?

It remains unclear what boundaries still exist for Ukraine’s use of Western missiles. So far, strikes have been reported in the Bryansk, Kursk, and Rostov regions — a total of five incidents with a total expenditure (according to data from the Russian MoD) of 25 ATACMS missiles and 12 Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles. There are also unconfirmed reports of an attempt to strike Yeysk in Krasnodar Krai.

The current selection of targets — two airfields/aircraft repair facilities, one command post, one air defense system position, and one ammunition depot — suggests efforts to disrupt Russian aviation at the tactical level, to interfere with combat command, and to “thin out” Russia’s air defense coverage zone.

Strikes using ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG appear to be part of Ukraine’s operations in Russia’s Kursk Region — though Ukrainian forces have yet to observe a significant effect from the missiles’ use there. Some reports suggest that the Russian Armed Forces have been tasked with eliminating Ukraine’s foothold in the Kursk Region before Donald Trump’s inauguration on Jan. 20, 2025 — presumably in order to strengthen Russia’s negotiating position in advance of hypothetical talks. Ukraine may be attempting to thwart this plan using ATACMS strikes.

Whatever the aim, the continuation of such strikes on Russian territory is unlikely to produce dramatic results. The limited impact of Western missile strikes can be better understood when compared to one of the largest coordinated Russian raids of the war, conducted on Nov. 17, 2024.

According to Ukrainian sources (1, 2), the attack involved the launch of over 100 Kh-101/Kh-555 and Kalibr missiles, eight Kinzhal missiles, and two Kh-22 missiles. These strikes were carried out using 15 Tu-95MS, six Tu-160, two Tu-22M3 bombers, eight MiG-31K fighters, and sea-based Kalibr carriers. Aircraft took off from airfields in the Murmansk, Saratov, and Nizhny Novgorod regions, with launch zones located in Volgograd and Tambov, as well as over the Black and Caspian Seas. Crucially, neither ATACMS nor Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles can reach the bases where these aircraft and their munitions are stored.

Had Western missile supplies without geographic restrictions been approved prior to Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive — rather than after its failure — the impact could have been significantly greater. For instance, in October 2023, ATACMS strikes successfully targeted a helicopter field airstrip in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Region. However, this came too late, as Russian army aviation had already played a decisive role in destroying Ukrainian mechanized columns during the summer campaign.

By September 2024, there were few remaining targets within a 300-kilometer zone on Russian territory, as 90% of the Russian aircraft launching glide bombs equipped with UMPK modules had been relocated further east, according to U.S. officials. Another constraint hindering Ukraine is the limited stock of the Western missiles themselves. The Insider’s defense columnist Colby Badhwar reported that as of December 2023, the U.S. had only 1,138 unexpired ATACMS missiles at its disposal, with an additional 1,238 missiles eligible for modernization and service life extension. Meanwhile, deliveries of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles to Ukraine are being measured in “dozens.”

Dozens can still be significant — so long as deliveries occur sufficiently often. Ukrainian data indicates that by September 2024, Russia had used only 1,300 Iskander missiles (an equivalent to ATACMS) and 1,846 Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles (comparable to the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG) since the start of its full-scale invasion nearly three years ago — putting the average combined weekly total of launches at just over 20. In other words, with uninterrupted supplies, Ukraine could achieve parity in long-range precision strike capabilities, although at this stage the Kremlin possesses far more such systems, with far greater range than those being made available to Ukraine.

The Biden administration’s decision to authorize the use of Western-made long-range missiles officially came in response to the deployment of North Korean troops in the combat zone, rather than to Ukraine’s repeated appeals for such permission. However, the diplomatic significance of the decision may outweigh its military value if ceasefire negotiations really do begin. Strikes on Russian airfields and ammunition depots may have had some effect on the Kremlin’s calculus: since late November 2024, there has been a noticeable decline in the use of Russian FAB glide bombs equipped with UMPK guidance kits.

In any case, Ukraine’s consistent use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles at their maximum range will force adjustments in Russian planning. Logistics and troop movements will likely be adapted to account for the increased threat, complicating transport distances and response times.

False escalation

Many observers feared that the use of Western missiles on Russian territory would provoke a new wave of escalation from Moscow. Instead, Russia deployed the “Oreshnik” — a new intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with hypersonic warheads — targeting the Pivdenmash aerospace plant in Dnipro. Putin described the missile's impact as comparable to a nuclear strike or a meteorite, though experts remain skeptical about its effectiveness when used without a nuclear payload.

While further strikes on Russian territory could prompt additional Oreshnik launches, the most severe consequence is likely to be an increase in Russian attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure — a pattern seen repeatedly when “red lines” set by the Kremlin have been crossed. By itself, the Oreshnik is unlikely to significantly influence the course of the war in Ukraine. Its estimated payload of 1.5 tons of explosives is equivalent to three quasi-ballistic Iskander missiles or three Kinzhal missiles. The Kremlin clearly has far more of these in stock than it does of the expensive Oreshniks. Meanwhile, the strike against Pivdenmash put the new missile’s very limited accuracy and destructive capacity on display, and the results were not game-changing.

From the perspective of nuclear escalation, nothing appears to be all that new. For more than two years Ukraine has been carrying out strikes on territory that Russia officially claims as part of its sovereign soil, and Putin’s response continues to be conventional. Oreshnik is not the first nuclear-capable system Russia has launched at Ukraine — both Iskanders and Kinzhal missiles can be armed with tactical nuclear warheads, and these systems have been striking Ukrainian targets since the start of the full-scale invasion. In other words, the Oreshnik functions more as a political signal than a practical military tool, with its message aimed not at Ukraine, but at the country’s Western allies, particularly in Europe.

Given that the overall effectiveness of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles will largely depend on the consistency of their supply to Ukraine, it is important that the suppliers of these long-range weapons not take Putin’s posturing too seriously. Even if the missiles are incapable of turning the tide in the war, Kyiv’s position is much more favorable with them than it would be without them.